New Delhi, March 25 – Pakistan has been identified by the United States' top intelligence official, Tulsi Gabbard, as a country whose advancing missile capabilities could eventually put the US within its reach. Director of National Intelligence, Gabbard, while presenting the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment before the Senate Intelligence Committee, also stated that Pakistan is researching and developing novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put the US within range.
However, Pakistan has rejected this assertion and stated that its strategic capabilities are exclusively defensive in nature and are aimed at safeguarding national sovereignty and maintaining peace and stability in the region. While Islamabad remains in denial, the US clearly notes that Pakistan is continuing to develop increasingly sophisticated technology.
There is a clear gap between Pakistan’s claimed doctrine of “credible deterrence” and the scale and global reach of its actual activities. Pakistan has maintained that its nuclear and missile programs are India-centric. However, if one looks at the evolution of the Shaheen-III, which has a range of nearly 2,750 kilometers, and the development of the Ababeel, capable of carrying out multiple independently targetable warheads, it becomes clear that Pakistan has gone beyond immediate regional requirements.
Disinfo Lab, a group of researchers who investigate information warfare and psychological warfare, revealed in a series of posts on X that Pakistan has one of the most notorious records in developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It states that one does not build Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capability for a neighbor which is 2,750 kilometers away. The reference was being made to Shaheen-III, which is capable of reaching Iran. A missile of this class brings cities like Tehran within its range, and this signals Pakistan’s technical ambitions, which edge towards longer-range delivery systems.
Officials say that if deterrence is limited only to India, then why is Pakistan pursuing capabilities that exceed that operational scope. Disinfo Lab also points towards the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is widely regarded as the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program. This network remains one of the most extensive proliferation operations in modern history. It is a well-known fact that Khan’s network supplied sensitive nuclear technology and designs to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The network operated through a web of intermediaries across continents. They used shell companies, illicit financial channels, and front-end procurement structures.
Pakistan says that it has distanced itself from Khan’s activities, but the legacy of the network continues to shape how global intelligence agencies interpret Pakistan’s present-day actions. Washington has since 2023 sanctioned dozens of entities that are linked to Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs, which include both domestic firms and foreign suppliers, especially from China. At the center of this ecosystem are state-linked entities such as the National Development Complex (NDC) and AERO, Pakistan’s military procurement arm for cruise missiles and strategic UAVs.
AERO, despite being blacklisted in 2014, has continued to acquire sensitive components through intermediary firms. Most of these entities have no public presence, no identifiable workforce, and no transparent financials. A feature in recent sanctions is the role that Chinese firms have played. They have been accused of supplying critical components, ranging from filament winding machines to advanced welding systems that are used in the production of missiles. These technologies fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts the proliferation of systems that are capable of delivering a payload of over 500 kilograms beyond 300 kilometers. Pakistan is not a signatory to the MTCR and limits its ability to procure such technologies through legitimate channels.
The US findings say that this has led to the expansion of covert procurement routes that involve intermediaries based in Karachi, front-end trading firms, and dual-use equipment masking. The United States has carried out multiple rounds of sanctions between 2023 and 2025, targeting entities linked to Pakistan’s missile program. Such sanctions are backed by intelligence assessments that have indicated active procurement attempts, ongoing program expansion, and the risk of proliferation.
Officials say that the big concern is that Pakistan’s weapons program is not just static, not strictly regional. Instead, the program is advancing technologically, expanding procurement networks, and operating through increasingly opaque channels. Pakistan, however, continues to project its nuclear arsenal as a defensive shield, which is limited and region-specific. Despite these claims, the writing is on the wall, and Pakistan has been illegally expanding its missile and nuclear capabilities. Pakistan watchers say that the concern is no longer about deterrence in South Asia, but about a program which raises serious and dangerous questions. Experts say that with so much material out in the open about Pakistan’s real intentions, the narrative of minimum deterrence has turned out to be a bluff.