Hong Kong, April 4 – With Iran striking and destroying the US AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan – deployed without the protection of a "well-networked system-of-systems architecture" – amid the ongoing conflict in West Asia, China’s fragmented intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the South China Sea (SCS) could be similarly vulnerable, a report stated on Saturday.
“The destruction of the AN/TPY-2 underscores the difficulty China faces in achieving information dominance in the South China Sea (SCS), despite massive investment in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities there,” a report in Hong Kong-based English newspaper 'Asia Times' detailed.
“Although China has developed multi-layered, overlapping ISR coverage in the SCS, it has yet to establish a well-networked system-of-systems architecture — a gap that presents an opportunity for Southeast Asian claimant states, the United States and its allies to challenge China's ‘informationized warfare’ in any SCS conflict,” it added.
The report stressed that the geography of the SCS, coupled with the fundamental physics of radar operation, imposes limits on China’s ISR capabilities.
A likely factor in Iran’s ability to hit such a formidable radar system is that it was not linked with other broader networks of systems capable of defending it against incoming threats.
According to the report, radar, which actively emits electromagnetic radiation, is inherently vulnerable to counterattack and requires a protective shield of airborne, naval or ground-based systems to defend against incoming threats.
“The AN/TPY-2 was deployed at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, just over 800 km from Iran — within its reported radar range — yet it could not thwart the incoming attack. Although details of the Iranian strike remain unknown, integration with airborne or ground-based radar systems would have improved its chances of doing so,” it detailed.
“A well-networked system-of-systems architecture is therefore indispensable for achieving information dominance — no individual system can perform at full potential in isolation, leaving exploitable gaps that only seamless integration can close,” it stated.
The report highlighted that China has not yet integrated its airborne, naval and ground-based radar systems for a real-time operational network.
“Although it has developed multi-layered, overlapping ISR coverage, without a well-networked system-of-systems architecture, those systems can only operate in isolation, providing minimal support to one another,” it noted.
The vulnerability, the report said, offers an opportunity for Southeast Asian claimant states, the United States and its allies to counter China’s "informationised warfare” — and its electronic warfare capabilities — preventing Beijing from “achieving information dominance in any SCS conflict”.